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UNLAWFUL/CRIMINAL ACTIVITY: THE ILL-DEFINED AND 
INADEQUATE PROVISION FOR A “STAND YOUR GROUND” DEFENSE   
R. Christopher Campbell        
 
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity, and who is attacked in 
any other place where he or she has a right to be, has no duty to retreat and has the 
right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, 
if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great 
bodily harm to himself or herself or another, or to prevent the commission of a 
forcible felony.1 – Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law     
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, the Governor’s Task Force on Citizen Safety and Protection released 
its Final Report on Florida’s controversial “Stand Your Ground” (“SYG”) law.2 
The task force, chaired by Lieutenant Governor Jennifer Carroll,3 was appointed a 
year earlier in the wake of the shooting death of seventeen-year-old Trayvon 
Martin.4 The shooting of the unarmed adolescent sparked an immense public 
outcry and ubiquitous debate over what role Florida’s SYG law had played in 
young Martin’s death.5 The mission of the Task Force was to review the SYG law, 
 ________________________  
  J.D., Widener University School of Law (Wilmington, DE). Much appreciation to Widener Law 
Professor H. Geoffrey Moulton for his insightful guidance and feedback on some closely related material. Thanks 
also to Michael F. McKeon, Esq., Thomas Finarelli, Esq., Ivy Kempf, Esq., and Scott Gershman for their valuable 
suggestions and comments. Last, but never least, a special thanks for my mother and my family for their enduring 
support.   
 1. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended June 20, 2014) (emphasis added). 
 2. The Honorable Jennifer Carroll, Governor’s Task Force on Citizen Safety and Protection (2013), 
available at http://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Citizen-Safety-and-Protection-Task-Force-
Report-FINAL.pdf.    
 3. Id. The Task Force also included several prominent Florida criminal attorneys, former judges, inter 
alios, as well as State Representative Dennis Baxley, member of the Florida House of Representatives, who 
initiated and developed the SYG law for the Florida Legislature; and State Senator David Simmons, member of 
the Florida Senate, who was the head of the Judiciary Committee and drafted the language of the current SYG 
statute. Id. 
          4.    . Id. See also, Jonathan Feingold and Karen Lorang, Defusing Implicit Bias, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 210, 213 (2012) (Trayvon Martin was walking on the street after returning from a local convenience 
store when George Zimmerman, a neighborhood watch captain, spotted Martin and followed him because he 
“looked suspicious.” Although the facts of the encounter between the two are in dispute, what is not in dispute is 
that Zimmerman shot the unarmed adolescent in the chest, killing him.).    
 5. Id. at 215. See, e.g., Eric Deggans, Trayvon Martin Update: Story Is Now More Covered Than 
Presidential Race, THE TAMPA BAY TIMES BLOG (March 30, 2012,12:10 PM), 
http://www.tampabay.com/blogs/media/content/trayvon-martin-update-story-now-more-covered-presidential-race. 
See also, Eric Lichtblau, Martin Death Spurs Group to Readjust Policy Focus, THE NEW YORK TIMES (April 17, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/18/us/trayvon-martin-death-spurs-group-to-readjust-policy-
focus.html?_r=1 (The firestorm surrounding the Martin-Zimmerman shooting became so intense that it facilitated 
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inter alia,6 and to make recommendations to the governor and the legislature on 
whether the law ensured the “rights of all Floridians and visitors, including the 
right to feel safe and secure in [the] state.”7   
Though concluding that Florida’s SYG statute should not be overturned,8 the 
Task Force most notably recommended that the law’s “conduct”9 provision needed 
clarification to “ensure uniform application of the law with the intent to protect the 
innocent person.”10 The Task Force cautioned that “without a clear definition of the 
term ‘unlawful activity’ the potential for inconsistent application of the law across 
the state may occur.”11   
When the SYG law was enacted in 2005, the legislature incorporated the 
ambiguous provision in the statute12 to deny the SYG affirmative defense to 
citizens engaged in “unlawful activity” at the time deadly force is used.13 The SYG 
statute, however, does not define “unlawful activity,” and courts have yet to fill 
that void.14 Further, without any guidance for the “unlawful activity” provision, 
  
a change in agenda within the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a conservative organization of 
state lawmakers who distributed the SYG bill to several states’ legislatures after Florida enacted the law.  In the 
middle of public outcry following Martin’s death, ALEC declared that it would no longer enter law enforcement or 
social politics and would now focus only on economic issues.).  
 6. Governor’s Task Force on Citizen Safety and Protection, supra note 3, at 10 (The Task Force’s 
purpose was to “thoroughly review Florida Statute Chapter 776 and any other laws, rules, regulations or programs 
that relate to public safety and citizen protection.”).  
 7. Id. at 11. 
The Task Force on Citizen Safety and Protection will review Chapter 776, Florida Statutes and its implementation, 
listen to the concerns and ideas from Floridians, and make recommendations to the Governor and Florida 
Legislature to ensure the rights of all Floridians and visitors, including the right to feel safe and secure in our state. 
Id. at 3. 
 8. Id. at 5 (the Task Force concurred that, “all persons who are conducting themselves in a lawful manner 
have a fundamental right to stand their ground and defend themselves from attack with proportionate force in 
every place they have a lawful right to be.”). 
 9. Generally, the SYG laws across the country have two elements that apply specifically to the defender 
before he can violate his duty to retreat.  A citizen is only able to stand his ground and use deadly force if: (1) he is 
not engaged in some form of unlawful or criminal activity, provoked the encounter, or was the initial aggressor; 
and (2) the person must be in a place where he or she has a right to be.  The first element is a “conduct” provision; 
the second is a “location” provision. 
 10. Id.  (some of the other recommendations by the Task Force included that state enforcement agencies, 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the judiciary should increase training and education regarding self-defense 
laws; to define the role of neighborhood watch participants; and whether the legislature should consider the 
extension of the civil immunity to cover innocent third-party victims.). 
 11. Id.  Critics of the SYG law have long maintained that the law has potential to be easily corrupted by 
criminals, who will use the law to excuse otherwise unlawful deadly force. See, e.g., Elizabeth B. Megale, Deadly 
Combinations: How Self-Defense Laws Pairing Immunity with a Presumption of Fear Allow Criminals to “Get 
Away with Murder”, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 105, 114 (2010) (“[The SYG] laws are not only ripe for abuse by 
would-be criminals, but they also provide absolutely no guidance to law enforcement, prosecutors, defendants, or 
the courts on how to assert immunity or claim a presumption under the law.”). See also Zachary L. Weaver, 
Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law: The Actual Effects and the Need for Clarification, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
395, 424 (2008) (arguing that the unlawful activity element “should be defined or, on the other hand, stricken 
entirely from the [SYG law].”). 
 12. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended June 20, 2014) (the SYG law was incorporated into the 
already existing Chapter 776 – Justifiable Use of Force). 
 13. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended June 20, 2014) (emphasis added). The Florida SYG 
statute provides, in part: “A person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and is attacked in any other place 
where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force 
with force.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 14. See generally, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (unlawful is defined as “not authorized by 
law.”). See also, Activity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2013), available at http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
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there is an uncertainty on whether there is a “nexus” requirement between the 
activities deemed unlawful and the force used.15 The provision also neglects to 
shed light on the time frame or temporal scope within which the citizen must be 
engaged in the “unlawful activity” in relation to the use of deadly force.16     
Since its enactment, the SYG law has received minimal treatment from legal 
commentators,17 and its “conduct” provision has received almost none. Yet, 
because of the lack of guidance from the legislature and the courts, it is the opinion 
of this author that the “unlawful activity” provision is the crux of the uneasiness 
surrounding the controversial law. The “unlawful activity” provision should be 
fundamental in determining whether the use of deadly force was indeed justified; 
instead, the provision is considerably too narrow in some respects, and far too 
inclusive in others, rendering the provision wholly inadequate in giving any 
guidance in determining whether an actor’s conduct should preclude him from the 
law’s protection.   
This article focuses on the SYG law’s “unlawful activity” provision and the 
need for its modification.18 Section II looks briefly at the development of the SYG 
law, spelling out the original purpose for including the “unlawful activity” element 
within the SYG statute. Section II also outlines and examines the primary as well 
as the underlying deficiencies with the ambiguous provision. Section II concludes 
by revealing how citizens can potentially avoid the restrictions of the “unlawful 
activity” provision altogether and still stand their ground and use deadly force. 
Section III suggests expunging the “unlawful activity” provision and proposes 
two alternative provisions to be used in its place. Part A of this section discusses 
the “true man” doctrine (the legislature’s primary influence for creating the SYG 
law), which permits only persons who are “without fault” to stand their ground and 
use deadly force in self-defense.  And finally, Part B examines the lack of temporal 
scope in the “unlawful activity” provision. This section proposes that a citizen 
should only be afforded a standard self-defense and not an SYG defense if he 
intentionally, recklessly, or knowingly places himself in a foreseeably threatening 
situation.   
  
dictionary/activity (activity is defined as “the quality or state of being active; vigorous or energetic action; natural 
or normal function . . .”). 
 15. See, e.g., Dawkins v. State, 252 P.3d 214, 218 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011) (“The [SYG] statute neither 
specifies a type of unlawful activity nor requires that it be connected to the use of defensive force. That is, the 
statute contains no nexus requirement.”). 
 16. Zachary L. Weaver, Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” Law: The Actual Effects and the Need for 
Clarification, 63 U. Miami L. Rev. 395, 412 (2008) (“[I]t is impossible to know the precise time-framing and 
degree of unlawful activity that will cause a user of force not to be protected by the law.”) 
 17. See Jeannie Suk, The True Woman: Scenes from the Law of Self-Defense, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
237, 238 (2008) (The SYG law “has not yet received a thorough analysis in the criminal law literature.”). 
 18. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013 (2013) (amended June 20, 2014). 
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II.  UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY19 
A.   Development and Deficiencies  
With Florida leading the way in 2005, more than twenty states have re-
envisioned the law of self-defense by enacting SYG laws.20 The new wave of 
statutes affirmed that a person, not only at home, but also at work, in a car, or in 
“any location where the person is legally allowed to be,” can stand his or her 
ground and use deadly force in self-defense.21 The new statutes are a large 
departure from the common law and the previous statutory law of self-defense, 
both of which mandated that a citizen had a duty to retreat prior to using deadly 
force.22   
Florida State Representative Dennis Baxley, with the support of the NRA, 
championed the SYG law through the Florida legislature.23 State Representative 
David Simmons, who was the head of the Judiciary Committee, penned the SYG 
statute by lifting Florida’s standard jury instructions from the Castle Doctrine24 and 
using them as a template for the new law.25 The stated objective of Florida’s SYG 
law was that “no person or victim of crime should be required to surrender his or 
her personal safety to a criminal.”26   
 ________________________  
 19. Although this note primarily focuses on Florida’s SYG law and its “unlawful activity” provision, the 
Florida law is a fair representation of other SYG laws throughout the nation. 
 20. Adam Winkler, Focus Must Be Narrower, in What Florida “Stand Your Ground” Law Says, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (March 21, 2012) (updated January 14, 2013 at 1:16 p.m.), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/03/21/do-stand-your-ground-laws-encourage-vigilantes/what-the-
florida-stand-your-ground-law-says. 
 21. See, e.g.,Fla. Stat. § 776.013 (2013) (amended June 20, 2014). 
 22. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999) (“Under Florida statutory and common law, a 
person may use deadly force in self-defense if he or she reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary to 
prevent imminent death or great bodily harm . . . Even under those circumstances, however, a person may not 
resort to deadly force without first using every reasonable means within his or her power to avoid the danger, 
including retreat.”). 
       22.       See Susan Ferris, NRA Helped Spread ‘Stand Your Ground’ Laws Across Nation, MCCLATCHY DC 
(March 26, 2012), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/03/26/143145/nra-helped-spread-stand-your-
ground.html#storylink=cpy#storylink=cpy#storylink=cpy (the NRA worked closely with Rep. Dennis Baxley, a 
prior recipient of the NRA’s Defender of Freedom award, in supporting the passage of the SYG law.). See, 
Leonard Martino, More Bad Law from the NRA, in Thursday’s Letters: Seek a Middle Ground on Open Carry, 
Letters to the Editor, THE TAMPA BAY TIMES (August 12, 2012), http://www.tampabay.com/ 
opinion/editorials/open-carry-more-bad-law-from-nra/1245247 (the NRA not only pushed hard for the passage of 
the SYG law, but also pushed for open-carry laws in Florida, where citizens would be permitted to openly carry 
firearms in public and at work). 
       23.       David Simmons, Without ‘Stand Your Ground,’ Attacker Can Have Advantage, THE ORLANDO 
SENTINEL (April 15, 2012), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-04-15/opinion/os-ed-stand-your-ground-law-
041512-20120413_1_innocent-victims-deadly-force-castle-doctrine (“we simply took Florida’s standard jury 
instruction regarding the Castle Doctrine permitting a victim who has a reasonable fear of death or great bodily 
injury to stand his or her ground, and meet force with force, in his or her own home. We then deleted the language 
limiting its application to the victim’s home.”). 
 25. Id. Simmons also stated that a citizen who uses the SYG defense “must show he was not engaged in an 
unlawful activity, such as threatening, stalking, assaulting or battering the alleged assailant.” (The article was 
written as an op-ed piece by Florida State Rep. Simmons in response to the public outcry over the SYG law 
following the Trayvon Martin shooting “to help clear up the confusion” over the law.) Id. 
 26. S.B. 436, 104th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005). 
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The “unlawful activity” provision was included in the SYG statute as an 
“important limitation” on when the use of deadly force was justified under the new 
law.27 Following the Trayvon Martin shooting, State Representative David 
Simmons publicly defended the SYG law and defined the “unlawful activity” 
provision as a “purity provision,” maintaining that it was included in the statute to 
deny the law’s protection to “aggressors,” people “waving a gun at someone,” and 
people “engaged in drug dealing.”28 The SYG statute, however, provides no such 
insight into the lawmakers’ intent.29  
The lack of clarity within the SYG statute conceivably allows criminals, who 
would otherwise have limited defenses to justify their use of deadly force, to be 
afforded a SYG defense.30 To illustrate, studies by the Washington Post found that 
homicides in Florida classified as “justified” tripled in the first five years following 
the enactment of the SYG law,31 even though the total number of homicides 
remained relatively the same.32 In the five years before the law was enacted, 
“justifiable” homicides were about twelve killings per year, mostly committed by 
law enforcement.33 In the first five years after the SYG law was enacted, 
“justifiable” homicides increased to thirty-six per year.34  Similarly, a study by the 
Tampa Bay Times, which comprised over 200 cases where the affirmative defense 
was utilized, found that the accused was set free almost 70% of the time.35 
In some instances, the “unlawful activity” provision’s lack of definition 
arguably has the opposite effect, where citizens believe they have a right to use 
  
WHEREAS, the Legislature finds that it is proper for law-abiding people to protect 
themselves, their families, and others from intruders and attackers without fear of 
prosecution or civil action for acting in defense of themselves and others, and WHEREAS, 
the castle doctrine is a common-law doctrine of ancient origins which declares that a 
person’s home is his or her castle, and; WHEREAS, Section 8 of Article I of the State 
Constitution guarantees the right of the people to bear arms in defense of themselves, and; 
WHEREAS, the persons residing in or visiting this state have a right to expect to remain 
unmolested within their homes or vehicles, and; WHEREAS, no person or victim of crime 
should be required to surrender his or her personal safety to a criminal, nor should a person 
or victim be required to needlessly retreat in the face of intrusion or attack, NOW, 
THEREFORE, Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida. 
Id. 
 27. See Simmons, supra note 23. 
 28. Id. See S.B. 436, 104th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2005) (“[N]o person or victim of crime should 
be required to surrender his or her personal safety to a criminal.”). 
 29. See Fla. Stat. § 776.013 (2013) (amended June 20, 2014). 
 30. See generally, Joe Palazzolo and Rob Barry, More Killings Called Self-Defense, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, March 31, 2012, at A1 (a Wall Street Journal study found that since 2005, while overall homicide 
numbers in states with SYG laws have stayed nearly the same level as prior to the enacted law, homicides 
classified as “justified” have increased by more than fifty percent).  
 31. Marc Fisher and Dan Eggen Justifiable Killings up as Self-Defense Is Redefined, THE WASHINGTON 
POST, April 8, 2012, at A1 (The Washington Post study used data from the Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement and the FBI.). 
 32. See Palazzolo, supra note 29. 
 33. See Fisher, supra note 30. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Kris Hundley, Susan Taylor Martin & Connie Humburg. Florida “Stand Your Ground” Law Yields 
Some Shocking Outcomes Depending on How Law Is Applied. TAMPA BAY TIMES, available at 
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/florida-stand-your-ground-law-yields-some-shocking-
outcomes-depending-on/1233133. 
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deadly force only later to be proven wrong by the court’s interpretation of the 
statute. For example, in Dorsey v. State, a convicted felon shot two students who 
threatened him at a high-school party.36 The court rejected the claim of self-
defense, holding that possession of a firearm by a convicted felon qualifies as 
“unlawful activity” within the meaning of the SYG law.37    
The Dorsey court balked at the opportunity, however, to define “unlawful 
activity.”38 Instead, the court simply made a “plain language” interpretation of the 
statute,39 holding that “[w]hatever the scope of that term [unlawful activity], we 
hold that possession of a firearm by a convicted felon qualifies as ‘unlawful 
activity’ within the meaning of the [SYG] law.”40 Unfortunately, the failure to 
define “unlawful activity” means that neither citizens nor courts have adequate 
notice of whether the provision applies to lesser offenses such as misdemeanors, 
minor traffic violations, or even ordinance infractions.41 Moreover, neither the 
SYG statute nor Dorsey make it clear whether the citizen must be charged and/or 
convicted of the “activity” that is deemed “unlawful.”42  
These failures to clarify the “unlawful activity” provision are not unique to 
Florida.  For example, in Dawkins v. State, an Oklahoma court held that any non-
minor offense43 committed by the person claiming a SYG defense at the time 
deadly force is used is satisfactory to render the SYG defense invalid.44 The court 
did opine that the legislature’s intent was to deny the SYG defense claim to those 
“actively” committing a crime;45 but, as an example of “actively” committing a 
crime, the court listed “possession of illegal drugs on the premises,” which 
 ________________________  
 36. Dorsey v. State, 74 So. 3d 521, 522–23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (the two assailants who were shot by 
the defendant had a reputation of violence and were known not to fight fairly). 
 37. Id. at 527.  The Dorsey court opined that the evidence of the incident “showed an impulsive 
overreaction to an attack, warranting convictions for manslaughter . . .” Id. at 525. See State v. Hill, 95 So. 3d 434, 
435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012), vacated in part, 143 So. 3d 981 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (concurring with Dorsey 
holding that a “defendant’s crime of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon precludes him from seeking 
immunity under the Stand Your Ground law.”). 
 38. See Dorsey, 74 So. 3d 521 (the court did not consider whether the defendant drinking underage at the 
time of the incident was “unlawful activity.”).  
 39. Id. at 527. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Megale, supra note 11, at 122 (Arguing that the “term “unlawful activity” in the [SYG] law is 
vague, and it is applied inconsistently throughout the state.  Notably, the alleged unlawful activity does not have to 
be related to the act of self-defense. For example, [presumably] a person who is driving without a license . . . is not 
entitled to the same presumption of reasonable fear if someone breaks into his occupied vehicle as someone who is 
not engaged in any illegal activity at all.”); see Governor’s Task Force on Citizen Safety and Protection, supra 
note 2, at 5. 
 42. See Megale, supra note 11, at 122 (Arguing that “[m]ust law enforcement charge the crime for it to be 
used in withholding the presumption of reasonable fear? Must the crime result in a conviction before it can be used 
to withhold the presumption of reasonable fear? [The SYG] statute fails to put the defendant on notice . . .”); see 
generally Stiehf v. State, 67 So. 3d 275, 278 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (note that courts have held that it is the 
state’s burden to overcome the defendant’s theory of self-defense and prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the 
defendant was not acting lawfully when he or she used deadly force). 
 43. Dawkins v. State, 252 P.3d 214, 218 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. (“We therefore conclude that the Legislature’s intent was to exclude from the benefit of this statute 
persons who are actively committing a crime, not persons who have or may have committed a crime in the past.”). 
The Dawkins court also theorized that “current crimes” would include the use of an illegal weapon used in an SYG 
self-defense. Id. 
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unmistakably lacks any nexus between the unlawful activity and the force used.46 
The court also enumerated examples of minor offenses that do not qualify as 
unlawful activity, such as “persons who are illegally parked” or are in “arrears with 
child support payments.”47 Thus, Dawkins did not require any nexus between the 
force used and the unlawful activity, yet precluded the affirmative defense if the 
unlawful activity was a higher grade of crime, even when unrelated to the incident.      
The lack of any required nexus between the unlawful activity and the force 
used can innocently elude citizens who are supposed to be placed on notice by a 
statute48 and may believe—in a heated moment—that they have a valid SYG 
defense claim. For instance, if a pedestrian carrying two grams of marijuana is 
walking on a street and is confronted by two armed assailants who demand his 
wallet, the law may require the pedestrian to flee before using deadly force in self-
defense.     
It is reasonable to believe that the legislators who included the “unlawful 
activity” element within the SYG law envisioned—and tried to avoid—a situation 
in which a person attempted a mugging, robbery, assault, stalking, or was involved 
in a drug deal gone wrong, and then when the tables were turned, asserted the SYG 
defense as justification for using deadly force.49 It is not, though, within reason for 
a citizen to know—as in the aforementioned example—that possession of two 
grams of marijuana is grounds to make his SYG defense invalid.     
In truth, the lack of any “nexus” requirement essentially results in a new 
unincorporated, yet contradictory, element within the SYG law. The foremost 
policy of the SYG statute is that it does not require citizens to pause to consider the 
possibility of safely fleeing;50 and yet the Dorsey and Dawkins courts ultimately 
require citizens to pause to consider all possible reasons why they may be 
compelled to flee as their self-defense may be later found invalid due to unlawful 
activity entirely unrelated to the threatening encounter.   
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes—in overturning a conviction of a defendant 
who failed to retreat and instead shot an assailant who threatened him with a 
blade—famously opined that “detached reflection cannot be demanded in the 
presence of an uplifted knife.”51 Justice Holmes’s inference is that a citizen cannot 
possibly think of all reasonable responses to a threat of danger in a split second, 
including whether he can safely flee. Dorsey and Dawkins distance themselves 
from Justice Holmes’s perceptive notion, thereby muddling the SYG law by not 
requiring a “nexus” and, as a result, indirectly hold that “detached reflection” is in 
fact an element of the SYG law.     
 ________________________  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 217 (“[A] statute’s text puts citizens on notice of prohibited conduct.”). 
 49. See Simmons, supra note 24 (Florida State Rep. David Simmons, who drafted the Florida SYG law, 
stated that the “unlawful activity” requirement is a “purity provision” included in the law to deny the affirmative 
defense to those who were engaged in “threatening, stalking, assaulting or battering the alleged assailant”; or to 
deny protection of the law to those who are the aggressor, waving a gun at someone, or engaged in drug dealing).  
 50. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended June 20, 2014). 
 51. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921).  
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B.   Road Map to Immunity 
For all of its glaring deficiencies, the “unlawful activity” provision may have 
reached a new low point in 2013.  Recent developments indicate that in an 
examination to determine whether a citizen is permitted to stand his ground and is 
not under a duty to retreat, the “unlawful activity” provision may be, above all, 
immaterial. Aside from the Castle Doctrine, Florida’s Justifiable Use of Force 
statute—which limits the use of force in almost all situations under Florida law—
has two sections that authorize deadly force in public without a duty to retreat; but 
only one of them, oddly, has an “unlawful activity” provision.52  
First, section 776.012(1) provides that a “person is justified in the use of deadly 
force and does not have a duty to retreat if . . . he or she reasonably believes that 
such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm.”53 Then, 
section 776.013(3), better known as the SYG law, states that: 
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any 
other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right 
to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he or 
she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily 
harm.54  
Pursuant to section 776.032(1), an actor in compliance with either of the 
aforementioned sections of the law is “immune from criminal prosecution and civil 
action.”55 
 ________________________  
 
 52. See FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2013) (amended June 20, 2014)—Use of force in defense of person: 
 
A person is justified in using force, except deadly force, against another when and to the 
extent that the person reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself 
or herself or another against the other’s imminent use of unlawful force. However, a person 
is justified in the use of deadly force and does not have a duty to retreat if: (1) He or she 
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily 
harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the imminent commission of a forcible 
felony; or (2) Under those circumstances permitted pursuant to § 776.013. 
 
Id. See also FLA. STAT.  § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended June 20, 2014): 
 
A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place 
where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her 
ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably believes it 
is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another 
or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. 
 
Id. 
 
 53. See FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1) (2013) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2014)) (emphasis 
added). 
 54. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended June 20, 2014) (emphasis added). 
 55. FLA. STAT. § 776.032(1) (2013) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2014)). 
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Although the two sections of the law appear eerily similar, it is easy to see the 
legislature’s thought processes on why it created the two standards.  If the 
threatened harm is imminent, under section 776.012(1), a citizen may not have an 
opportunity to retreat before utilizing deadly force; he therefore should still be 
permitted to protect himself and be afforded immunity under the law.56 This goes 
back to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s perceptive notion that a person cannot 
think of all reasonable responses in a split second of danger, including whether he 
can safely flee.57 Should there be an opportunity to retreat, and the SYG law would 
apply, giving the citizen more or less the option of whether to retreat or stand his 
ground if deadly force is necessary—but a citizen could only stand his ground if he 
was not engaged in unlawful activity and in a place that he had a right to be.58 In 
having two different standards of when a citizen has no duty to retreat, a citizen 
could potentially skirt his duty to retreat, use deadly force, and then choose 
between the two standards to see which one better fits his circumstances in order to 
gain immunity from prosecution.  
In 2013, Little v. State addressed this issue when it took on the question of 
whether a person who uses deadly force while engaged in “unlawful activity” can 
still be entitled to immunity under the law.59 In Little, the defendant shot and killed 
a man who he claimed was the aggressor.60 Little maintained that he reasonably 
believed that his use of deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent death or 
great bodily harm, and he therefore had no duty to retreat.61 The trouble was that 
Little was a convicted felon in possession of a firearm at the time of the shooting.62 
Under Dorsey v. State, his possession of a firearm as a convicted felon would 
disqualify him from the SYG law’s protection.63 However, Little claimed that the 
authority for his use of deadly force came not from the SYG law, but from section 
776.012(1), which has no “unlawful activity” provision.64 Therefore, he should be 
provided immunity from criminal prosecution if shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that his use of deadly force was in response to an imminent threat.65   
The state, recognizing the gap between the two sections of the statute, argued 
that it was clearly not the legislature’s intent that the “unlawful activity” provision 
should apply to just one of the two no-duty-to-retreat sections of the law; if so, 
section 776.012(1) would effectively undermine the SYG law.66 But the court 
broadly rejected this argument, and, in finding for Little, reasoned that the two 
 ________________________  
 56. See FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1) (2013) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2014)). 
 57. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). 
 58. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended June 20, 2014) (emphasis added). 
 59. Little v. State, 111 So. 3d 214, 216 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 60. Id. at 217. In Little, outside of a friend’s home, the victim raised a gun, directed it at the defendant, 
who, in response, fired his gun at the victim several times with his eyes closed, killing him. Id. 
 61. Id. at 218. 
 62. Id. at 219. 
 63. Dorsey v. State, 74 So. 3d 521 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011); see also State v. Hill, 95 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (upholding Dorsey). 
 64. Little, 111 So. 3d at 222. See also FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1) (2013) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 
776.012(2) (2014)). 
 65. Horn v. State, 17 So. 3d 836, 839 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). See Little, 111 So. 3d at 222. 
 66. Little, 111 So. 3d 219.  
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sections of the law, although very similar, are plainly distinguishable: one section 
requires that the threatened harm be imminent, and the other—the SYG law—
requires only that the use of force be necessary.67 Since Little met his burden, that 
the threatened harm was imminent under section 776.012(1), the court held that he 
had no duty to retreat, which rendered his possession of the illegal firearm 
immaterial.68  
Although the holding in Little maintains otherwise, it is unlikely that an actor 
would find it necessary to use deadly force in response to a threatened harm that is 
not imminent.69 Thus, the practical effect of Little is that an actor can safely 
sidestep the “unlawful activity” provision by simply limiting the scope of the 
examination of his use of deadly force to the precise moment the force was used—
in that moment was the threatened harm imminent?70 
For instance, if a drug courier is transporting two pounds of marijuana and is 
confronted by armed assailants who demand his cargo, the SYG law may require 
the drug courier to flee before using deadly force. Under the law’s “unlawful 
activity” provision, the possession and transportation of drugs may nullify his right 
to stand his ground.71 But if the courier can demonstrate that the threatened harm 
by the armed assailants was imminent, section 776.012(1) may find the drug 
courier’s use of deadly force justified.72 Any time assailants brandish a gun or 
wield a knife with malicious intentions toward a person in close proximity, is not 
the threatened harm always imminent? 
To the legal community and the general public at large, the court’s opinion in 
Little provides a road map to immunity in situations where a citizen’s duty to 
retreat is not satisfied. By limiting the scope of the encounter to the moment the 
threatened harm was imminent, an actor who violated his duty to retreat has a far 
greater advantage under section 776.012(1) than under the SYG statute in gaining 
 ________________________  
 67. Id. at 221. The court reasoned that the  
 
requirements under sections 776.012(1) and 776.013(3) are not identical. A person 
proceeding under section 776.013(3) would have to prove that he or she reasonably believed 
the use of deadly force was “necessary ... to prevent death or great bodily harm ... or to 
prevent the commission of a forcible felony.” Under section 776.012(1), a person would 
have to prove that he or she reasonably believed the use of deadly force was “necessary to 
prevent imminent death or great bodily harm ... or to prevent the imminent commission of a 
forcible felony.” 
 
Id. For its reasoning, the court relied on the doctrine of in pari material, which is used for statutory construction. 
In pari material requires that “statutes relating to the same subject or object be construed together to harmonize 
the statutes and to give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” (quoting Fla. Dep’t of State v. Martin, 916 So. 2d 763, 
768 (Fla. 2005)). Id. 
 68. Id. at 222. 
 69. Id. at 221–23 (majority claimed that the “burden of proof and the entitlement to the various 
presumptions to assist in meeting that burden varies depending upon which statute [section 776.012(1) or the SYG 
law] applies.”) (Northcutt, J., concurring opined that it was difficult to imagine a situation where a citizen could 
“reasonably think it necessary to use deadly force to prevent death or great bodily harm without believing that the 
threatened harm is imminent.”). 
 70. See FLA. STAT. § 776.012(1) (2013) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 776.012(2) (2014)). 
 71. See Dawkins v. State, 252 P.3d  214, 218 (Okla. 2011). 
 72. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.012(1) (2013) (current version at Fla. Stat. § 776.012(2) (2014)). 
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immunity from the law. This advantage would effectively render the SYG law 
meaningless.73 For this reason, the failure of the “unlawful activity” provision is 
now unmistakably complete—the provision is not just ill-defined and inadequate, it 
may also be of no consequence.    
III.  PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE “STAND YOUR GROUND” LAW74 
The Final Report of the Governor’s Task Force on Citizen Safety and 
Protection included recommendations for revisions to the “unlawful activity” 
element of the SYG law.75 These recommendations proposed that any revision to 
the “unlawful activity” element should: (1) contain a provision excluding 
“noncriminal violations as defined in Section 775.08(3)”76 of Florida Statutes;77 (2) 
include some guidance with regard to the “temporal proximity of the unlawful 
activity to the use of force”;78 (3) contain a provision excluding “some county and 
municipal ordinance violations”;79 and (4) exclude, with any revision, “citizenship 
status.”80 
The Task Force correctly pointed out that there is a lack of guidance on any 
“temporal proximity” between the force used and the “unlawful activity” within the 
SYG law, but failed to suggest any viable alternatives to remedy its absence.81 
Regrettably, the remaining recommendations would have a negligible impact on 
the current law. As previously stated, a fundamental objective of the SYG law is 
that “no person or victim of crime should be required to surrender his or her 
 ________________________  
 73. See Little, 111 So. 3d at 219 (in acknowledging the opposing view point, Little paraphrased the State’s 
argument in that “section 776.012(1) cannot provide a separate basis for immunity because it would provide 
immunity for a person engaged in an unlawful activity and thus render section 776.013(3) meaningless.”). 
 74. Governor’s Task Force on Citizen Safety and Protection, supra note 2, at 5. The modifications 
discussed in this section should be applied to both §776.012(1) and §776.013(3) of Florida’s Justifiable Use of 
Force statute, even though §776.012(1) does not presently have an “unlawful activity” provision for its use of 
deadly force. Id. 
 75. Id. In making its recommendations, the Task Force held public meetings, interviewed “subject matter 
experts,” and received thousands of correspondences from citizens. Id. 
 76. See FLA. STAT. § 775.08(3) (2013): 
 
The term ‘noncriminal violation’ shall mean any offense that is punishable under the laws of 
this state, or that would be punishable if committed in this state, by no other penalty than a 
fine, forfeiture, or other civil penalty. A noncriminal violation does not constitute a crime, 
and conviction for a noncriminal violation shall not give rise to any legal disability based on 
a criminal offense. The term ‘noncriminal violation’ shall not mean any conviction for any 
violation of any municipal or county ordinance. Nothing contained in this code shall repeal 
or change the penalty for a violation of any municipal or county ordinance. 
 
Id. 
 77. See Governor’s Task Force on Citizen Safety and Protection, supra note 2, at 5. 
 78. Id. (emphasis added). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See id. It is opinion of this author that the Task Force neglected to perform any substantive research on 
the “unlawful activity” provision, as its final report failed to cite any authority to support or challenge the 
provision’s effectiveness.  
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personal safety to a criminal.”82 The Task Force’s recommendations egregiously 
fail to address this objective because the recommendations do not effectively 
distinguish criminals from law-abiding citizens. So how do you distinguish 
criminals from law-abiding citizens with such a law? The distinction between those 
who should be afforded the SYG defense and those who should be prohibited is 
certainly not located within the “unlawful activity” provision, as the courts and the 
legislature have both failed to define the ambiguous provision or its scope.83 The 
distinction can instead be found in one of the SYG law’s foremost influences—the 
“true man” doctrine.84 
A.   Without Fault and Did Not Provoke 
The “true man” doctrine stems from the landmark 1895 United States Supreme 
Court case of Beard v. United States.85 In Beard, the defendant was on his own 
land outside his home when three brothers approached and surrounded him.86 
Beard, holding a gun in his hand, assaulted one of the brothers with the gun’s 
barrel, killing him.87 Beard was tried and found guilty of manslaughter in the 
United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Arkansas,88 but appealed to 
the Supreme Court of the United States where his conviction was reversed and 
remanded for a new trial.89 Justice John Harlan, writing for the Court, held that a 
person on his own premises, even though not inside his home, has no duty to 
retreat before using deadly force in self-defense.90    
Perhaps Beard was merely extending the Castle Doctrine91 to the surrounding 
premises and curtilage of the home. Justice Harlan’s rationale, however, is not 
clear on this point, as he never references the Castle Doctrine in the Court’s 
opinion.92 Still, the Beard Court viewed the home as a place where a person was 
legally allowed to be; therefore, under the principle that outside the home was also 
 ________________________  
 82. See S.B. 436, supra note 25. 
 83. See Governor’s Task Force on Citizen Safety and Protection, supra note 2, at 5. 
 84. See Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 561 (1895).  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. at 552. 
 87. Id. at 552–53. 
 88. Id. at 550. In Beard, the U.S. Circuit Court for the Western District of Arkansas had jurisdiction over 
the matter because the killing occurred in Arkansas Indian Territory. Id.  
 89. Id. at 567. 
 90. See Beard, 158 U.S. at 563–64. 
 91. The Castle Doctrine is a product of a motto widely recognized in the United States—the idea that “a 
man’s house is his castle,” and deadly force is generally permissible, without a duty to first retreat, for protection 
from intruders. See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: 
CONCERNING HIGH TREAFON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAULES 162 (London, 4th ed. 
1669) (“[F]or a man’s house is his castle, & domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium; for where shall a man be 
safe, if it be not in his house”). See also People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914) (Justice Cardozo 
opined that “[f]light is for sanctuary and shelter, and shelter, if not sanctuary, is in the home. That there is, in such 
a situation, no duty to retreat is, we think, the settled law in the United States as in England.”); 2 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: IN FOUR BOOKS; WITH AN ANALYSIS OF THE WORK 
187 (New York, W.E. Dean 1838) (“But it is clear . . . that where I kill a thief that breaks into my house, the 
original default can never be upon my side”). 
 92. See Beard, 158 U.S. at 550. 
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a place a person was legally allowed to be, the Court declared that “a true man who 
is without fault is not obliged to fl[ee] from an assailant.”93 The “true man” notion 
thus became a mode to expand the Castle Doctrine outside the home.94   
The “true man” doctrine became the self-defense doctrine in a number of states 
following the Beard ruling.95 Although some commentators have theorized that a 
“true man” is one who should not endure the loss of dignity and honor by fleeing 
from assailants,96 the doctrine is ostensibly a mosaic of attributes based in part on 
the “tendency of the American mind,” which is “strongly against the enforcement 
of any rule that requires a person to flee when assailed.”97   
Aside from the notions of honor and respect, the “true man” doctrine’s primary 
prerequisite is that only “one without fault” is permitted to use deadly force.98 In 
Voight v. State, a 1908 Texas case upholding the doctrine, the court acknowledged 
that “the party in the wrong must do the retreating.  Our law is more favorable to 
 ________________________  
 93. Id. at 561. 
 94. See Suk, supra note 16, at 247 (“The home, traditionally the only place where there was no duty to 
retreat, became the means to perform the expansion to the ‘true man’ rule of no duty to retreat.  The true man’s 
role . . . functioned as a model for the broader self-defense right of the true man.”).   
Where Beard did not address whether the “true man” doctrine would have extended to one who is off his premises, 
Brown v. United States, written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, acknowledged that a citizen could also have a 
valid self-defense claim without first retreating when using deadly force in a public place. Brown v. United 
States, 256 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1921). In Brown, where the defendant was threatened and previously assaulted by a 
man and was later approached again by the same man at a post office with a knife, the defendant retreated to his 
coat hanging on the wall, produced a gun, and shot the man. Id. at 342. The Brown court, in light of the Beard 
holding, agreed that the premises just outside the home was a place where a person was legally allowed to be, and, 
accordingly, held that any public place, as well, was a place a person was legally allowed to be. Id. at 344. 
Therefore, a citizen in any place he has a legal right to be has no duty to retreat under the same principle as one 
who is on his own property. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 505–08 (1896); People v. Lewis, 48 P. 1088, 1090 
(Cal. 1897); and Voight v. State, 109 S.W. 205, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1908), all upholding the “true man” 
doctrine. 
 96. Steven F. Shatz & Naomi R. Shatz, Chivalry Is Not Dead: Murder, Gender, and the Death Penalty, 27 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 64, 75 (2012) (“[The true man] doctrine holds that the true man cannot be 
expected to suffer the loss of dignity and honor that would result from fleeing his assailant because the virtue of 
the true man is worth more than the life of an aggressor.”). See also State v. Renner, No. 03C01-9302-CR-00034, 
1994 WL 501778 at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 1994) (theorizing that “the rationale behind this [true man] 
rule comes from a policy against making a person act in a cowardly or humiliating manner”). 
 97. Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877): 
 
A very brief examination of the American authorities makes it evident that the ancient 
doctrine, as to the duty of a person assailed to retreat as far as he can, before he is justified 
in repelling force by force, has been greatly modified in this country, and has with us a 
much narrower application than formerly. Indeed, the tendency of the American mind seems 
to be very strongly against the enforcement of any rule which requires a person to flee when 
assailed, to avoid chastisement or even to save human life, and that tendency is well 
illustrated by the recent decisions of our courts, bearing on the general subject of the right of 
self-defence [sic]. 
 
Id. See also Lydia Zbrzeznj, Florida’s Controversial Gun Policy: Liberally Permitting Citizens to Arm Themselves 
and Broadly Recognizing the Right to Act in Self-Defense, 13 FL. COASTAL L. REV. 231, 235 (2012) [hereinafter 
Zbrzeznj] (stating that “the majority of states abandoned the duty to retreat. This shift was founded on ideals of 
strength and valor (such as the American mind and true man justifications for self-defense), along with a frontier-
inspired abhorrence for the cowardice of retreat in the face of a wrongful attack.”). 
 98. See Beard, 158 U.S. at 561. 
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the man who is in the right, and places a less burden upon him in homicide cases 
than upon the man who is in the wrong and produces the occasion.”99 Further 
stated, “[i]t is one of the fundamental principles of the law of homicide, whenever 
the doctrine of self-defense arises, that the accused himself must always be 
reasonably free from fault, in having provoked or brought on the difficulty in 
which the killing was perpetrated.”100  
The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) as well does not have an “unlawful activity” 
barrier to the use of deadly force in self-defense.101 The Code instead states that 
“[t]he use of deadly force is not justifiable . . . [if] the actor, with the purpose of 
causing death or serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself in 
the same encounter.”102 Courts have interpreted the provoked condition to mean 
that one who incites or inflames the confrontation is denied the use of deadly 
force.103 Prior to the passage of the SYG law, several jurisdictions held that in order 
to establish a claim of self-defense, a slayer was required to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that “[he was] free from fault in provoking or 
continuing the difficulty which resulted in the slaying.”104   
A handful of courts have extended the “provoke” provision by defining the 
term to include “speech” as well as “action.”105 In these jurisdictions, words single-
handedly are enough to provoke an attack.106 Hence, an actor who instigates an 
attack by verbal taunts alone can conceivably be deprived the right of self-
defense.107 A majority of courts, however, declare that words alone cannot amount 
to sufficient provocation for an attack.108 Nonetheless, even if the actor provoked 
the threatening encounter, a greater number of courts hold that the initial aggressor 
 ________________________  
 99. Voight, 109 S.W. at 207 (emphasis added).  
 100. Storey v. State, 71 Ala. 329, 336 (1882) (emphasis added). 
 101. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (2001). Self-defense statutes in several states mirror the MPC 
in denying a self-defense claim to those who provoke the threatening encounter.  See also, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 627(I)(a–b) (2014) (stating that force is not justifiable if: “(a) [w]ith a purpose to cause physical harm to 
another person, [the actor] provoked the use of unlawful, non-deadly force by such other person; or (b) [h]e was 
the initial aggressor . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1409(4)(a) (LexisNexis 2014) (stating that force is not 
justifiable if: “(a) [t]he actor, with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily harm, provoked the use of force 
against himself in the same encounter.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-19(c) (West 2010) (affirms that “a 
person is not justified in using physical force when (1) with intent to cause physical injury or death to another 
person, he provokes the use of physical force by such other person, or (2) he is the initial aggressor . . . .”). 
 102. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (emphasis added).  Note that the MPC does not have what would 
be the equivalent of the Castle Doctrine; thus, the MPC implies that its self-defense provisions do not differentiate 
between whether one is at home or in public. 
 103. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Galloway, 485 A.2d 776, 783 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (“First, the actor must 
have reasonably believed himself to be in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, and that it was 
necessary to use deadly force against the victim to prevent such harm. Second, the actor must have been free from 
fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty [that] resulted in the slaying.  Third, the actor must have violated no 
duty to retreat.”). See also State v. Lewis, 717 A.2d 1140, 1158 (Conn. 1998)  (holding that “one who is the 
aggressor in a conflict culminating in death cannot invoke the necessities of self-preservation”). 
 104. See, e.g., Galloway, 485 A.2d at 783 (emphasis added). 
 105. See State v. Gorham, 412 A.2d 1017, 1019 (N.H. 1980). 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. 
 108. See, e.g., State v. Stevenson, 188 A. 750, 751 (Del. Oyer & Term. 1936) (“A person very plainly has 
not the right to provoke a quarrel and then take advantage of it to justify the homicide arising from the quarrel 
which he himself provoked . . . no looks, or gestures, however insulting, and no words, however offensive they 
may be, can amount in law to a provocation sufficient to justify an assault.”). 
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can still regain his right of self-defense if he effectively withdrew from the 
confrontation.109    
If the “true man” doctrine were incorporated into the SYG law, citizens would 
be better apprised of the legislature’s intent to deny those who are “in the wrong” 
from using the affirmative defense.110 By adding the “provoked” element, courts 
would also be better informed by the modified statute that only those who do not 
incite or inflame the confrontation are permitted to claim the right to stand their 
ground.    
The commonsensical logic of the “true man” doctrine cannot be ignored. To 
illustrate, take the prior example of the pedestrian carrying two grams of marijuana 
who is confronted by armed assailants who demand his wallet—under the current 
law, courts would struggle weighing the threat of force by the assailants against the 
possession of drugs by the pedestrian in determining whether the pedestrian is 
afforded a SYG defense. Both aspects may be deemed “unlawful.” But under the 
suggested not at fault in provoking the attack provision, the pedestrian would be 
afforded the law’s protection since the two armed assailants were “at fault” in 
provoking the confrontation by demanding the pedestrian’s wallet by a threat of 
force. The pedestrian’s possession of drugs would only be significant if the 
possession motivated the attack.111  
B.   Foreseeability of Attack   
Without any guidance on the temporal scope of the “unlawful activity” 
provision, the circumstances taken into account in determining whether an actor 
should be afforded the SYG defense are presumably limited to the immediate 
events surrounding the threatening encounter.112 Within this small window, if all of 
the SYG law’s elements are satisfied, including the “unlawful activity” provision, 
the law will provide a citizen its protection.113 An unfortunate result of this partial 
inquiry is that citizens engaged in criminal activities (e.g., drug dealers or 
organized crime figures) who expose themselves to foreseeable dangerous 
encounters inherent in their criminal trades, will be able to end-run their duty to 
retreat. This end-run may permit the use of deadly force under circumstances that 
would otherwise be classified as murder.  
For instance, in Florida in 2008, Tavarious China Smith was approached and 
threatened by two brothers who sought a percentage of his drug sales.114 Smith 
 ________________________  
 109. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627(I)(b) (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(c) (West 2010). 
 110. See Robert Stephens, Life and Liberty: Seven Factors That Will Better Evaluate Self-Defense in 
Nevada’s Common Law on Retreat, 8 NEV. L.J. 649, 666–67 (2008) [hereinafter Stephens] (The “true-man” 
doctrine, like standard self-defense, requires a defendant to prove that “a reasonable person in similar 
circumstances would believe that the aggressor would take his life or cause great bodily harm.”). 
 111. See infra p. 25, and note 134. 
 112. See FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended June 20, 2014).  
 113. Id. 
 114. See Kris Hundley, Drug Dealer Used ‘Stand Your Ground’ to Avoid Charges in Two Killings, TAMPA 
BAY TIMES, June 16, 2012, available at http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/drug-dealer-used-stand-
your-ground-to-avoid-charges-in-two-killings/1235650 [hereinafter Hundley]. 
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refused to pay the percentage and subsequently armed himself with a gun.115 A few 
weeks later, the brothers again confronted Smith; this time Smith shot and killed 
one of them and claimed the shooting was in self-defense under the SYG law.116 
Even though Smith was a known drug dealer117 and the threatening encounter was 
instigated by a dispute over drug territory, the prosecutor declined to file 
charges.118  
When analyzing the encounter between Smith and the brothers in a vacuum, 
Smith was in compliance with all provisions of the SYG law at the time of the 
shooting: his use of deadly force was necessary to prevent imminent and serious 
bodily harm, and he therefore had no duty to retreat and could “stand his 
ground.”119 Yet, if the circumstances that preceded the incident were taken into 
account, it is unfortunate that the law would still provide Smith an SYG defense. 
Smith’s inherently dangerous line of work as a drug dealer was the primary 
circumstance that contributed to the threatening encounter.120 Smith, as a drug 
dealer, knowingly or recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was 
foreseeable or even probable that he would be subjected to an attack.121 
Accordingly, the law should not afford Smith the protection of an SYG defense; 
instead, Smith should have to prove a standard self-defense in that he satisfied his 
duty to retreat before shooting the assailant.122    
A provision denying a defendant a specific defense if he “knowingly” or 
“recklessly” places himself in the predicament is not new to American 
Jurisprudence.123 This provision is widely used under the law of “duress.”124 In 
Utah, for example, a duress defense is unavailable to a person who “intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it is probable that 
he will be subjected to duress.”125 In Colorado, a duress defense is not available 
when a person “intentionally or recklessly places himself in a situation in which it 
is foreseeable that he will be subjected to such force or threatened use thereof.”126 
The MPC, as well, affirms that duress is “unavailable if the actor recklessly placed 
 ________________________  
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. (Smith had a pending drug warrant at the time of the shooting). 
 118. Id.  
 119. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended June 20, 2014) (that Smith’s use of deadly force was 
necessary to prevent imminent and serious bodily harm and that he could stand his ground is presumably what the 
prosecutor concluded when he decided not to file charges). 
 120. Hundley, supra note 112. Smith had a history of misdemeanor drug possession. Id.  Smith also had 
been charged for selling crack cocaine and marijuana to police officers on two occasions. Id.  
 121. Fact Sheet – Drug Related Crime, Drugs and Crime Data, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice 
Programs - Bureau of Justice Statistics (1994), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/DRRC.PDF [hereinafter 
Bureau of Judicial Statistics] (Violent crimes tend to be associated with the sale of drugs—the reasons include: 
“competition for drug markets and customers” and “disputes and rip-offs among individuals involved in the illegal 
drug market.”). 
 122. See Weiland v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999). 
 123. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2) (2001). 
 124. See id. 
 125. UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 76-2-302(2) (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-14 (West 2013). 
 126. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-708 (West 2013). 
16
Barry Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 3
https://lawpublications.barry.edu/barrylrev/vol20/iss1/3
2014 Unlawful/Criminal Activity 59 
 
himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected 
to duress.”127   
Courts have even denied the duress defense to an actor who recklessly places 
himself in the situation days, weeks, or even years prior to the time of the alleged 
duress.128 In Williams v. Maryland, the defendant robbed an establishment with the 
purpose of settling a debt with a drug organization.129 The defendant claimed a 
duress defense because the men to whom he owed the money coerced him to 
commit the robbery under a threat of force.130 The court disagreed and held that 
since the situation was of Mr. Williams’s own making, he should not be afforded 
the defense.131 The court stated that the defendant’s prior conduct “contributed 
mightily to the predicament” in which he later found himself.132 The court reasoned 
that the defendant voluntarily became involved in the drug organization by 
borrowing money from it and by making previous drug runs for it.133  
If the duress exception were modified to fit the SYG law, in that an actor is 
denied the defense if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a 
situation in which it is foreseeable that he will be subjected to attack, a drug dealer, 
such as in the above case of Tavarious China Smith, would not be afforded an SYG 
defense if attacked by drug-dealing competitors. When applying the 
“foreseeability”134 provision to Smith’s encounter with the brothers, the risk of 
 ________________________  
 127. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(2) (emphasis added): 
 
The defense provided by this Section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in 
a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is 
also unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever 
negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged. 
 
Id. Under the law of duress, “recklessly” is defined as:  
 
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or 
will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering 
the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its 
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person 
would observe in the actor’s situation. 
 
State v. Heinemann, 920 A.2d 2708, 295 (Conn. 2007). See also Commonwealth v. DeMarco, 809 A.2d 256, 262 
(Pa. 2002) (holding that, “like the test for determining whether the defendant was subject to duress, the test for 
determining whether a defendant acted recklessly . . . is a hybrid objective-subjective [standard].”) (Citations 
omitted). 
 128. See Williams v. State, 646 A.2d 1101, 1110 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994). See also Meador v. State, 664 
S.W.2d 878, 881 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that “[d]uress is not a defense if [the actor] recklessly placed 
himself in a situation in which it was reasonably foreseeable that he would be subjected to the force or threatened 
force”). 
 129. Williams, 646 A.2d at 1103. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1110 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  
 134. See Benjamin Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate Cause, 44 WAKE F. L. REV. 
1247, 1254 (2009) [hereinafter Zipursky].  “Foreseeability” comes with an aspect of risk.  Risk and foreseeability 
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Smith having violent encounters with other drug dealers is at or near the top of 
foreseeable dangers inherent in his criminal trade.135 Therefore, Smith would not be 
afforded an SYG defense since he knowingly placed himself in the situation.136 
If on the other hand, a homeless man attacked a known violent drug dealer with 
a knife demanding the drug dealer’s coat, the proposed modification to the SYG 
law would still afford the drug dealer the law’s protection. The drug dealer would 
not have recklessly or knowingly placed himself, by means of his of illegal 
profession, in a situation in which it was foreseeable that he would be subjected to 
attack. A drug dealer is no more likely than any ordinary citizen to be robbed of his 
coat by a homeless man in a non drug-related confrontation. That risk is simply not 
one inherent in the sale of drugs.137   
In 2006, Jacqueline Galas, a prostitute, while at the residence of a client, shot 
and killed the client after he threatened to kill her.138 The prosecutor declined to file 
charges against Galas, citing the SYG law.139 Critics argued that the affirmative 
defense should not have applied to Galas since she shot her client while acting in 
the unlawful capacity as a prostitute.140 Since Galas recklessly or knowingly placed 
herself in the situation in her capacity as a prostitute, the SYG law, modified with 
the above suggestions, would not afford her a SYG defense. Her encounter with a 
client who threatened to kill her was a foreseeable danger inherent in the 
prostitution trade.141 For this reason, Galas would only have the standard self-
defense available to her since she recklessly placed herself in the foreseeably 
dangerous situation.142  
If the same man, however, confronted Galas after her car became stranded in a 
crime-ridden neighborhood because she recklessly forgot to fill her tank with gas, 
the proposed modification would provide her a SYG defense.  Her profession as a 
prostitute would be irrelevant.  The foreseeable risk of recklessly not filling her car 
  
are not one in the same but substantially overlap. Id. The classic example of the “risk test” is handing a loaded gun 
to a young child who drops the gun, breaking his foot. Id. at 1253. The law forbids recovery of damages against 
the actor who handed the loaded gun to the child, reasoning that the “risk” of handing a loaded gun to a child is 
that the gun may accidently discharge, and not that it would break a child’s foot when dropped. Id. 
 135. See Bureau of Judicial Statistics, supra note 119. 
 136. Take again the example of the pedestrian carrying two grams of marijuana who is confronted by armed 
assailants who demand his wallet—under this example, if it is determined that the marijuana, and not the wallet, 
motivated the attack, the pedestrian would not be afforded an SYG defense under the proposed “foreseeability” 
modification.   
 137. In this scenario, the homeless man is “at fault.” 
 138. See Zbrzeznj, supra note 95, at 261. 
 139. Id. at 262  
 140. Id.   
 141. Prostitution: The “World’s Oldest” and Most Dangerous Profession, PROJECT SOCIAL ART.COM 
(November 12, 2011), http://projectsocialart.com/blog/ 2011/11/12/prostitution-the-
%E2%80%98world%E2%80%99s-oldest%E2%80%99-and-most-dangerous-profession/. Some reports indicate 
that clients of street-prostitutes account for 60% of the abuse against them; police account for 20% of abuse; and 
partners account for 20% of abuse. Id. (citing to MARGO ST. JAMES, WHAT’S A GIRL LIKE YOU...? (1980)). Another 
study found that up to 80% of prostitutes have been assaulted. Id. (citing to SAN FRANSICO BAY AREA HOMELESS 
PROJECT: HOMELESSNESS AND SURVIVAL SEX, http://www.bayswan.org/homeless.html (last visited October 10, 
2014)). 
 142. See Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1049 (Fla. 1999). 
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with gas is that the car would stall; the risk is not that she would be accosted in a 
high-crime area.143 
Combining the “true man” doctrine, the MPC, and the modified “foreseeable” 
exception borrowed from the law of duress, the “unlawful activity” provision 
should be expunged and the SYG law should be revised as follows: 
A person who [] is attacked in any other place where he or she has 
a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or 
her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he 
or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death 
or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent 
the commission of a forcible felony, unless the person was: (1) at 
fault in provoking the attack; or (2) intentionally, knowingly, or 
recklessly placed himself or herself in a situation in which it was 
foreseeable or probable that he or she would be subjected to 
attack.144    
 
One predictable criticism to the above-proposed modifications to the SYG law 
is that the modifications would do little to curtail the use of illegal firearms in the 
commission of a SYG defense. Under the aforementioned drug dealer example, if 
the drug dealer used an illegal gun in a SYG defense against the homeless man 
who demanded his coat, the proposed modification to the SYG law would do little 
to give a court any guidance. Since the use of the illegal weapon would have no 
nexus with the incident, a court may struggle with whether to deny the drug dealer 
the use of the affirmative defense.   
To rectify this potential ambiguity in the proposed modification, the revised 
SYG statute should have an additional provision that simply states: “A person is 
not justified under this statute if the deadly force used against another is with an 
illegal firearm.”145 Along with the additional provision giving more guidance to the 
courts, an added benefit of the provision is that it may potentially, albeit only 
slightly, curtail the purchase and/or carrying of illegal firearms. The provision 
would do so by placing citizens on notice that even the use of deadly force under 
 ________________________  
 143. See Zipurski, supra note 132. 
 144. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (amended June 20, 2014) (emphasis added). See Governor’s Task 
Force on Citizen Safety and Protection, supra note 2, at 5. 
 145. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. § 505(b)(2.3) (2013), which implies that the use of an illegal 
firearm will invalidate an SYG defense claim by stating that simple possession of an illegal firearm is sufficient to 
void the affirmative defense: 
 
An actor who is not engaged in a criminal activity, who is not in illegal possession of a 
firearm and who is attacked in any place where the actor would have a duty to retreat under 
paragraph . . . has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his ground and use force. . . . 
 
Id. See Dawkins v. State, 252 P.3d 214, 217 (Okla. 2011) (holding that use of an illegally modified weapon 
(sawed-off shotgun) in the commission of self-defense under the SYG law is an “unlawful act”). 
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valid circumstances pursuant to the SYG law would be unauthorized if it involved 
an illegal firearm.      
IV.  CONCLUSION  
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once related, when opining on the law of self-
defense, that the “failure to retreat is a circumstance to be considered with all the 
others in order to determine whether the defendant went further than he was 
justified in doing; not a categorical proof of guilt.”146 With this passage, some 
commentators have suggested that Justice Holmes was simply articulating that 
there is neither a duty to retreat nor a right to stand your ground when facing 
deadly encounters;147 rather, there are just a plethora of subjective interpretations 
used by the court to determine whether the actor was justified in using deadly force 
in self-defense.148   
The modifications proposed in this note are undeniably adding to the subjective 
interpretations already enveloping the law of self-defense. Still, since the SYG law 
endorses greater leeway than standard self-defense for an actor to use deadly force, 
the law should also provide greater safeguards to ensure that the use of deadly 
force is not pervasive.149 Indeed, there is no greater demand on the laws of any 
society than to protect and value human life. Thus, framing the threatening 
encounter,150 by factoring in all relevant circumstances leading up to it, should be 
essential in order for citizens to feel “safe and secure.”151    
 
V.  ADDENDUM: RECENT CHANGES TO THE “STAND YOUR GROUND” LAW 
In 2014, less than ten years after being the first state to enact the SYG law, the 
Florida legislature incorporated several changes to the law.152 On top of the public 
 ________________________  
 146. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921). 
 147. See Stephens, supra note 108, at 653. Like-minded with Justice Holmes, some commentators argue that 
there should be a middle-ground analysis between the duty to retreat and the right to stand your ground, in that 
there should be “balance between the necessity of the non-aggressor to protect his life and liberty, and the value of 
the aggressor’s life.” 
 148. Garret Epps, Any Which Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward Violence in the 
Evolution of the “Anglo-American Retreat Rule,” 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 322 (1992) (theorizing that there 
was no rule to retreat nor a rule to stand your ground, but just a “series of complex . . . subjective judgments” on 
the “physical movements of the actors, their spoken communications at the time of the incident, and their prior 
relationships [which] justified a finding of self-defense”). 
 149. See Kay Steiger, Study: “Stand Your Ground” Laws Result in an Additional 4 to 7 Killings Per Month, 
THE RAW STORY (June 27, 2012), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/06/27/study-stand-your-ground-laws-result-
in-an-additional-4-to-7-killings-per-month/ (citing a study completed by the National Bureau of Economics 
concluding that homicide rates of white males have increased an additional four to seven killings per month from 
the rates prior to the law being enacted).  
 150. See Margaret Raymond, Looking for Trouble: Framing and the Dignitary Interest in the Law of Self-
Defense, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 287, 288 (2010) (“Framing” is when in order to determine whether the actor was “at 
fault” in producing the occasion, the court or fact-finder look backwards to frame the context of the encounter, 
reviewing all the circumstances that led up to the use of deadly force). 
 151. See Governor’s Task Force on Citizen Safety and Protection, supra note 7.  
 152. FLA. STAT. §776.013 (2013) (amended June 20, 2014); FLA. STAT. §776.012 (2013) (amended June 20, 
2014). 
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outcry over the SYG law, the revisions were, undoubtedly, a response to the 
conflicting cases of Little and Dorsey.  The most significant revision to the SYG 
law removed the “unlawful activity” provision and incorporated a “criminal 
activity” provision in its place.153  By replacing the word “unlawful” with the word 
“criminal,” the legislature was also most likely responding to the recommendations 
by the Governor’s Task Force, which requested clarification for the “conduct” 
provision to “ensure uniform application” of the law across the state.154  The new 
provision does shed a touch of light on some of the ambiguity in the previous 
provision.  For instance, immigration status may be unlawful, but not criminal.  
Moreover, it is now clear that most ordinance infractions are no longer within the 
purview of the ‘conduct’ provision as those, too, may be deemed unlawful, but not 
criminal.155    
Save for the prospective of additional guidance on ordinance infractions and 
immigrations status, what the new provision noticeably leaves out is the most 
compelling issue the Task Force identified: the “conduct” provision’s lack of 
guidance on the “temporal proximity of the unlawful activity to the use of force.”156 
The revisions also failed to tackle many of the issues the Task Force neglected to 
point out, including the lack of a “nexus” requirement between the criminal (or 
unlawful) activity and the force used;157 whether one is required to be charged 
and/or convicted of the activity that is deemed criminal;158 and whether one should 
still be able to employ an SYG defense if he or she knowingly or recklessly placed 
himself or herself in a foreseeable threatening encounter.159  
In its report, the Task Force also called for the legislature to supply a “statutory 
definition [of the term ‘unlawful activity’] to provide clarity to all persons, 
regardless of citizenship status, and to law enforcement, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, and the judiciary.”160  Florida’s SYG law, in its section on home 
 ________________________  
 153. Id.  Of the more than twenty states with an adaptation of the SYG law, only four states aside from 
Florida use some form of a “criminal activity” provision: Texas, Nevada, North Carolina, and Michigan.  
 154. See Governor’s Task Force on Citizen Safety and Protection, supra note 3, at 5.  See also American 
Bar Association National Task Force on Stand Your Ground Laws, Preliminary Report and Recommendations 
(2014), p. 39 (The American Bar Task Force recommended that the “Stand Your Ground laws should clarify and 
specifically delineate the circumstances under which “unlawful activity” would operate as a bar to asserting a 
defense of the use of force. Specifically, the Task Force recommends evaluations address:  
 
i. Whether the commission of criminal misdemeanors, violations of municipal ordinances, 
or minor traffic infractions preclude the application of Stand Your Ground law; and ii. 
additional guidance to judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys of the original intent 
behind the unlawful activity prohibition. iii. Citizenship status should not be a justifiable 
basis to preclude individuals from utilizing a Stand Your Ground law defense. 
Id. 
 155. See Governor’s Task Force on Citizen Safety and Protection, supra note 3, at 5.  These 
recommendations were echoed by the American Bar Association National Task Force on Stand Your Ground 
Laws, Preliminary Report and Recommendations (2014), page 25.    
 156. Id. 
 157. See Dawkins v. State, 252 P.3d 214, 218 (Okla. Crim. App. 2011). 
 158. See Megale, supra note 11. 
 159. See supra Section III.  
 160. Governor’s Task Force on Citizen Safety and Protection, supra note 3, at 5. 
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protection, wisely offers definitions on the terms dwelling, residence and vehicle,161 
but absent from any portion of the law, for a second straight time, is a definition for 
its “conduct” provision.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word criminal as 
“[h]aving the character of a crime; in the nature of a crime.”162  With such a broad 
and vague definition, it is challenging to identify, and agree on, the scope and 
application of the new “conduct” provision. 
The Florida legislature has also now faltered twice in attaining its objective for 
including the “conduct” provision within the statute.  Florida State Rep. David 
Simmons, who drafted the first SYG law, stated that the “unlawful activity” 
requirement was intended to exclude people from the law’s protection who were 
“threatening, stalking, assaulting, or battering”; were an aggressor, waving a gun at 
someone, or engaged in drug dealing.163 Simply put, what the legislature wants is a 
“conduct” provision that denies someone who initiated the threatening encounter 
from using the SYG law as a defense.  
Rep. Simmons’s above examples, by and large, refer to an aggressor who may 
wrongly use the SYG law as an affirmative defense after instigating the encounter; 
but in all of the examples conveyed by Rep. Simmons, there is a nexus between the 
force used and the criminal conduct.  In none of his examples would the law not 
provide protection to an unsuspecting pedestrian carrying two grams of marijuana 
who is confronted by armed assailants that demand his wallet.  Yet because the 
new provision so resembles “unlawful activity,” courts will continue to struggle 
mightily in weighing the threat of force by the assailant and the engagement in 
crime by the defender, no matter how remote the relationship with that crime is, or 
how distant in time that crime occurred.164  Thus, even with the new revisions to 
the SYG law, the potential for inconsistent application of the law across the state 
continues to exist.165      
 
 
 ________________________  
 161. The definitions were left intact following the 2014 revisions. FLA. STAT. § 776.013(5) (2013) (amended 
June 20, 2014). 
 162. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  
 163. The new “criminal activity” provision is ostensibly being used for the same purpose. 
 164. See Hundley et. al, supra note 35 (finding that in almost a third of the cases the Tampa Bay Times 
reviewed, the accused was set free via the SYG law, even though the accused started the conformation, chased the 
victim, or shot an unarmed citizen).  
 165. See Governor’s Task Force on Citizen Safety and Protection, supra note 3, at 5, (“without a clear 
definition of the term ‘unlawful activity’ the potential for inconsistent application of the law across the state may 
occur”). 
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